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The Impact of Legal Origin on the Relationship between  
Analyst Following and Recognised Intangibles 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
 
This study examines whether legal origin has an impact on the association between analyst 
following and intangibles recognised in corporate financial statements.  Using a sample of 
7,233 company-year observations from ten countries for 2004-2006, this study finds that the 
association between analyst following and recognised intangibles is impacted by legal origin.  
Analyst following is higher for companies that have recognised intangibles than for those that 
do not,  and it is also higher for companies from civil law countries. Further, when intangible 
assets are recognised on the balance sheet, or research and development expense is included 
in the income statement, the increase in analyst following is greater for companies from civil 
law countries than for those from common law countries. The findings suggest that companies 
recognising intangibles in civil law countries provide greater opportunity for analysts to make 
an incremental information contribution to investors than those companies in common law 
jurisdictions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Accounting for intangible assets, particularly identifiable intangible assets, has been an 
ongoing issue that continues to generate interest, debate and research.  In December 2007, the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) decided against taking an intangible assets project onto their active agenda 
primarily because of other competing active agenda priorities.  However, the importance of 
addressing the accounting issues relating to intangible assets was acknowledged by both 
Boards.   
 
This is an area of particular interest because under international (and many national) 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP) there are restrictions on accounting 
recognition for some types of intangibles on the balance sheet and differing treatments of 
R&D.  According to some (e.g. Arewa, 2004), this results in a perceived withholding of 
relevant information.  This is particularly important as the investment community makes use 
of accounting variables and the ratios derived from them in evaluating a firm’s cost of capital 
and growth opportunities.  
 
Until around three decades ago, the asset base of a typical company was mainly tangible, with 
an apparent link between asset values and share prices.  However, from the early 1980s 
corporate book values shrank in relation to market values and the capital market’s view of the 
value of intangible assets rose (Lev & Daum, 2004).  Today a large proportion of firm value 
often consists of intangible assets (Ballow, Burgman & Molnar, 2004; Gaum, Ittner, Larcker, 
Low, Siesfield & Malone, 2000).  With intangible assets frequently not accorded recognition 
in general purpose financial accounting reports, the link between reported net asset values and 
corporate market values is weakened (Amir & Lev, 1996; Francis & Schipper, 1999; Lev & 
Zarowin, 1999). 
 
Value generated by a company is recognised through both accounting information and the 
investment community (the market).  Financial analysts assist in the determination of value 
through their forecasts and recommendations.  These analysts supplement publicly available 
accounting reports with private information, including their interpretation of published reports.  
In their choice of which companies to follow, analysts seek to maximise their own expected 
utility.   
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Two US studies, Barth, Kasznik & McNichols (2001) and Barron, Byard, Kile & Riedl (2002) 
examine analyst following relative to the existence of corporate intangibles.  They chose 
intangibles because it is an area where existing financial reporting does a poor job of helping 
investors place a value on intangibles.  This provides analysts with the opportunity to provide 
incremental value to investors for companies recognising intangibles (and be compensated for 
adding that value).  They predict and find that more analysts will follow companies with 
intangibles. Thus US analysts respond to the demands of investors for more information 
because of the difficulty in evaluating a company’s intangible assets, and seek to maximize 
their expected utility by choosing to follow companies with intangibles.  A natural question is 
whether this finding is unique to the US or do analysts in other countries also seek to 
maximise their own expected utility by following companies with identifiable intangibles?  
Bush (2005) finds that there are many differences between the US and the rest of the world in 
both financial statement preparation and in corporate governance matters.  Hence the first 
issue this paper addresses is: 'Does the recognition of intangibles lead to greater analyst 
following in countries other than the US?'  
 
The cross-country variation within the study is further examined within the context of legal 
origin.  Companies in different countries have differing drivers for their provision of 
information.  These are often related to whether a country is more shareholder or stakeholder 
orientated, orientations that are associated with common and civil law countries respectively 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000).  In a common law system, financial reporting tends to focus 
on the external investors and ensures that they are well informed, whereas in a civil law 
system financial reporting is more often used to facilitate relationship-based financing.  
 
This difference in the objectives behind financial reporting in the two different environments 
can lead to observed differences on analyst activity. For example, in his study using 
international data up to 1995, Hope (2003d) uses analyst following as a proxy for a rich 
information environment and finds less impact from legal origin on companies with high 
analyst following.  Hope (2003d) argues that a company’s analyst following therefore has a 
moderating role on the relation between disclosure and legal system. 
  
If analysts have a greater opportunity to add value to investors for companies in countries 
from one legal system compared to another, then this would suggest that accounting 
disclosures in one legal system are of less value to investors than disclosures in another.  Prior 
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research suggests that companies from civil law countries have higher analyst following than 
those from common law countries (e.g. Chang, Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Hope, 2003d), but 
how is this affected by the recognition of intangibles?  If analyst following is greater for civil 
law companies disclosing intangibles then it would suggest that accounting disclosures for 
intangibles are less informative in civil law countries than in common law countries.  That is, 
there is a bigger incentive for analysts to follow companies with intangibles in civil law 
countries.  Hence, the second issue the paper addresses (assuming that analyst following is 
greater in civil law countries) is: 'Does the recognition of intangibles lead to a larger increase 
in analyst following in civil law countries than in common law countries?’ 
 
Answering the research questions provides further insight into the influence of recognised 
intangibles within the investment community and highlights differences that exist between 
companies in different legal origins. This study contributes to the literature by combining two 
separate strands of research: firstly that of analyst following and legal origin, and secondly 
that of analyst following and intangibles. Thus it examines the interaction between analyst 
following, legal origin and intangibles.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses prior literature and the motivation for the 
study.  Section 3 introduces the research question and hypothesis and describes the data. 
Section 4 discusses the sample, models and variables.  Section 5 presents empirical results. 
Concluding remarks are made in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Prior Literature 
 
2.1 Financial analysts 
 
Financial analysts often forecast information on earnings, share prices and cash flows but this 
study focuses on analysts producing earnings forecasts.1 These forecasts and 
recommendations are based on information gleaned from both private and public sources.    
Hence, analysts increase the amount of information that is publicly known about a company 
                                                 
1
 Earnings, determined under the accrual method, are regarded as a better indication of firm performance than 
cash flows, with the accrual basis providing information that is of most use in making economic decisions 
(Dechow, 1994). 
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(Roulstone, 2003).  Further, greater analyst following is associated with an improvement in 
the flow of information into prices (Brennan, Jegadeesh & Swaminathan, 1993).  These 
observations suggest that analysts provide information that is valued by the market.  Even 
analysts’ decisions to follow a company provide value to that company (Alford & Berger, 
1999; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; Healy & Palepu, 2001; McNichols & O’Brien, 2001) 
and increase firm liquidity (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995; Irvine, 2003).  The extent of 
analyst following is often used as a proxy for the richness of available corporate information 
(Lang, Lins & Miller, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lys & Soo, 1995) and/or information 
processing by informed investors (Brennan et al., 1993; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1995).  
Thus, the analysts’ choice of which companies to follow is significant. 
 
The analysts’ role of uncovering and then disseminating information to the market place 
contributes to market efficiency.  One source of information is financial accounting reports.  
Financial reports have a role in reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
investors (e.g. Healy & Palepu, 2001) but this information needs to be relevant and timely 
(e.g. Frankel & Li, 2004). These reports and analysts’ activities can be viewed as either 
substitutes or complements. Bushman and Smith (2001) propose arguments both ways.  The 
economic benefits of a high quality accounting regime can be amplified by financial analysts 
facilitating the interpretation and dissemination of the information provided by financial 
accounting.  In turn, additional financial accounting disclosures are likely to increase the 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations.  These mutually supportive 
effects suggest that financial accounting disclosures and analyst activities are complements.  
Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2003) also support a complementary relationship between 
information from analysts and financial reports when they find that analysts are more 
informative when financial statements are more highly related to prices. 
 
On the other hand, financial accounting disclosures and analyst activities could also act as 
substitutes.  For example, when investors ignore confusing accounting reports and rely on 
financial analysts, or when high quality, transparent financial accounting information reduces 
the need for analysts’ research activities.  This study is interested in the impact of one aspect 
of accounting disclosure, the recognition of intangibles. 
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2.2 Intangibles 
 
Expenditure on intangibles is regarded as an investment in anticipation of future benefits.  
This investment can be through R&D, used to generate innovation resulting in assets such as 
patents, trademarks, brands software or other rights; or it can be through the acquisition of 
those assets.2  But accounting for intangibles has been regarded as one of the most 
controversial issues in the globalisation of accounting standards, with divided opinion on 
whether some or all intangible assets should be capitalised (Chalmers, Clinch & Godfrey, 
2008).  Financial statements have been criticized for not recognising intangibles as assets (and 
acknowledging the future economic benefits) but merely as costs, which are expensed in the 
period in which they are incurred.  With rising investment in intangibles, a number of studies 
have documented that the value-relevance of accounting has been decreasing because 
accounting numbers have been less able to explain variations in stock prices (e.g. Aboody & 
Lev, 1998; Lev & Zarowin, 1999).  But while the investment in intangibles is regarded as 
relevant for corporate valuation, it is less reliable than investment in tangible assets because of 
the greater uncertainty as to when and if economic benefits will be achieved.   
 
There has been a mixed approach to disclosure aspects of intangible investment across 
countries with a concern over the lack of recognition of internally generated intangibles on the 
balance sheet (reinforced by the stand taken by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) in International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 Intangible Assets).  As a consequence, 
there continues to be an interest in how intangible value is recognised, with many suggesting 
that more has to be done to formalise recognition.  
 
With many countries adopting international standards there has been a consequent tightening 
of previously more liberal approaches to recognition and disclosure. This has raised concerns.  
Wyatt (2005) suggests that limiting managements’ choices to record intangible assets reduces, 
rather than improves, the quality of the balance sheet and the investors’ information set.  
Arewa (2004) expresses concern that unless legal and accounting regimes are amended to 
address the problem of intangible value and treatment, financial statements and required 
disclosure will not be relevant, material or reflect underlying economic reality.   
                                                 
2
 Advertising, too, can be instrumental in creating intangible value, but advertising expenditure is not available 
from databases for companies outside the US (Barniv, Myring & Thomas, 2005). 
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Garcia-Ayuso (2003) suggests that the current accounting model needs to be improved to 
ensure disclosure of a greater amount of higher quality information on the intangible 
components of corporate value.  Investors must make decisions under conditions of 
uncertainty, compounded by information asymmetry between managers and investors and 
among investors themselves (Wyatt, 2008). Managers should clarify the links between 
intangible investments and future value creation in a language that analysts and investors are 
able to understand (Garcia-Ayuso, 2003).  Such a move will improve market efficiency 
because there will be an increase in transparency and a reduction in information asymmetry. 
Holland (2003) feels that market volatility in world stock markets will begin to decline only 
when analysts (and fund managers) become more competent and sophisticated at valuing 
intangibles. 
 
Some argue that disclosure of a measure such as R&D is not a reliable indicator of future 
benefits, but that even unreliable numbers can be useful signals that (unobservable) assets 
exist, pointing investors in the direction of additional relevant information sources (Wyatt, 
2008).  However, while financial accounting is only one source of information on intangibles, 
stock price studies find that information on intangibles is significant (Wyatt, 2008).3  
Additionally Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo (2006) find that recognition in financial statements is 
more reliable than simple disclosure and Barth, Clinch and Shibano (2003) find that 
recognition of (rather than simply disclosing)  a highly unreliable accounting amount can 
result in greater price informativeness. So while there may be limitations to the use of 
accounting numbers, there is support to suggest that these numbers can be meaningful to 
those interpreting financial information.   
 
This study examines the association between analyst following and two accounting numbers 
that represent value to an organisation, R&D expenses and balance sheet identifiable 
intangibles.   
 
2.3 Legal origin 
 
                                                 
3
 Wyatt (2008) suggests that this needs future research to try to design studies that separate out higher value-
relevance versus measurement and research design issues such as omitted variables. 
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Most prior studies associating intangibles and analysts have been US based (e.g. Amir, Lev & 
Sougiannis, 2003; Barth et al., 2001; Barron et al., 2002), although there is an Australian-
based study by Matolscy & Wyatt (2006).  The current study examines the association for 
non-US companies covering ten different countries to determine whether the results are 
country dependent.  The focus is on a country’s legal origin because of the recognised 
differences with respect to accounting and analyst activity.  La Porta, de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2008), in their review of Legal Origins Theory, claim that legal origin leads to 
systematic differences, both measurable and quantifiable, in legal rules and regulations across 
countries and that these differences matter for social and economic outcomes.  Legal origin in 
its primitive form (common versus civil law) is used in this study.   
 
Common law countries generally have more effective investor protection (e.g. Bushman, 
Piotroski & Smith, 2004; La Porta et al., 1998) and higher-quality and more transparent 
financial reporting systems (e.g. Ball et al., 2000; Ball, Robin & Wu, 2003, Francis, Khurana 
& Pereira, 2003).  Civil-law countries, on the other hand, have a reduced demand for earnings 
information.  
 
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find common law countries tend to have 
more developed capital markets than civil law countries, with those with French civil law the 
least developed and with the weakest legal protection for investors. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2003) state that German civil law and British common law countries have 
significantly better developed financial intermediaries and markets and better property right 
protection than French civil law countries.   Barniv, Myring and Thomas (2005) also state that 
amongst the civil law countries those of Nordic origin have higher-quality financial reporting 
and stronger investor protection laws.  In a general progression of market development it 
seems that the order is English, German-Nordic (or Nordic-German) and French.   
 
In addition to investor protection, other factors have been suggested as contributors to 
differences in the financial environments across countries, such as: rule of law, judicial 
efficiency and insider trading laws (La Porta et al., 1997; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003); 
and the importance of the stock market and ‘insider vs. outsider’ economies (La Porta, de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999).  However, these factors all have a high correlation with 
legal origin, so legal origin is regarded as the primitive form, explaining most of the variation 
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(Hope, 2003d).  But with the acknowledged variation amongst the civil law countries, civil 
legal origin will also be split into the French, German and Nordic components.   
 
One view suggests that countries with high-quality standards for required financial reporting 
should be associated with an increase in analyst following because they have more complete 
and reliable information with which to make predictions.  But an alternative viewpoint is that 
a high level disclosure could lower the demand for analysts because it reduces the need for 
analysts’ research activities if they compete with, rather than complement, company 
information.  So a higher level of disclosure lessens the competition amongst analysts and the 
incentive to cover a company (Hope, 2003a; Lang et al., 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1996).  
 
Some studies indicate that analyst following should be greater when ownership is more 
diverse (Bhushan, 1989), markets are more developed (and the majority of capital comes from 
external equity) (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and where there are strong shareholder rights (Lang, 
Lins & Miller, 2004).  These are all features of common law countries.  However, it has also 
been argued that there should be fewer analysts for companies with strong shareholder rights 
(Core, Guay & Rusticus, 2006), suggesting that analyst following might be lower in common 
law countries and some studies support this (e.g. Chang, Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Hope, 
2003d).   
 
 
3. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Research in the US by Barth et al. (2000) and Barron et al. (2002) suggests that the presence 
of intangibles leads to greater analyst following.  The first aspect of interest in the research 
study was to determine whether this finding holds true in a broader international context. 
 
Hence the first hypothesis is: 
H1: Analyst following is greater for companies that recognise intangibles, 
regardless of country. 
  
The second aspect of interest is the effect on analyst following of recognised R&D and 
identifiable intangibles and legal origin.  The literature provides mixed results for legal origin 
and analyst following.  Some features of common law countries would support greater analyst 
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following (e.g. Bhushan, 1989; Lang et al., 2004; Rajan & Zingales, 1995) but other studies 
such as Chang et al. (2000) and Hope (2003d) suggest that analyst following might be lower 
in common law countries.    
 
With respect to intangible recognition and legal origin, some studies suggest that intangible 
recognition might have less impact in civil law countries.  Munari et al. (2005) find a negative 
relationship between intangibles (R&D intensity) and companies whose ownership structure 
is more prevalent in civil than common law countries.  Additionally, Hall and Oriani (2005) 
observe a smaller recognition by the market for estimated R&D in German and French 
companies, compared to UK companies.  Ball et al. (2000) point out that civil law accounting 
standards give managers the ability to defer discretionary expenditures such as R&D, using 
this to smooth earnings.  This means that there could be less credibility attached to R&D 
disclosure.   
 
The second hypothesis is: 
H2: The relation between intangible recognition and analyst following differs 
between common law countries and civil law countries.   
 
Although a difference is anticipated, the direction is unclear because the results from previous 
studies are mixed.  Whereas analyst following might well be higher in companies from civil 
law countries, the environment for those companies might not be so conducive to intangibles’ 
recognition.  However, if intangibles are recognised, this may influence analyst following.  
Hence the model in the study will include interactive effects for the relationship between legal 
origin and recognised intangibles. 
 
 
4. Sample, models and variables 
 
4.1  Sample 
 
The full dataset was comprised of 7,233 companies from ten countries over a period of three 
years from 2004-2006.  There were four common law based countries (United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and six civil law based countries (Denmark, France, 
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Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland).   The civil law countries were chosen to provide 
two countries from each of the three different civil legal regimes: French, German and Nordic.    
 
Selection of the countries involved was initially based on size, with the companies selected 
being those with the largest number of companies in the databases.  However, Denmark was 
chosen over Norway (the second-largest country) because both Sweden and Denmark 
represented mid-values with respect to the percentage of intangibles for the countries, while 
Norway and Finland had more extreme values.  New Zealand was included to provide a 
second southern hemisphere country in the common law group.   
 
Selection of the companies within the countries was based on availability of data.  All 
companies for which the information required was obtainable were included in the final 
sample. Inclusion of the US in legal origin studies can be hugely influential as seen in studies 
such as that by Barniv et al. (2005). There are clear distinctions between US and non-US 
companies even within a common legal origin. US companies are much larger and have 
greater analyst following than their non-US counterparts.  Hence, this study uses companies 
outside the US to remove the dominant influence it might have on the findings.   
 
The raw data was collected from the Compustat Global and I/B/E/S databases with the former 
providing the raw accounting information and the latter the analyst information.  Data from 
the two databases was matched company by company, and only companies for which all 
necessary data was available (not only in the raw data but also the computed data) became 
part of the final sample. 
 
4.2 Models 
 
4.2.1 Model structure 
The models used were ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models with analyst following 
as the dependent variable.  The variables used were company-level variables in a particular 
year, with three years covered in the study.  The variables used in the study are listed in   
Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
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Two alternative measures were used for the variable ‘recognition of intangibles’.  The first 
was a binary measure, indicating only the presence of identifiable intangible assets and R&D 
(IIAB and RDB).  The second was a measure of magnitude using identifiable intangible assets 
and R&D each scaled by total assets (IIAM and RDM). Legal origin was represented through 
the common law legal origin (LEGAL), with the civil law legal origins further split into 
French (FRE), German (GER) and Nordic (NOR). The control variables used in the model 
were: market value of equity (MVE), market-to-book value of equity (MKTBK), earnings 
change (EC), earnings volatility (EVOL), stock return variation (RETVAR), leverage (LEV) 
and industry. Natural logs were used for all the control variables, except for LEV, as their 
distributions were not normal, even after winsorising at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  
 
The initial analyses used the data without further adjustment.  However, there was a wide 
variation in the size of these variables across countries.  So one of the robustness tests applied 
was to deflate each of these variables by the average value for each country.  This provided a 
basis for comparison with Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) who control for cross-
country variation in the market value of equity by using the market capitalisation of 
companies at the fiscal year end divided by the mean for the associated country, and Chang et 
al. (2000) who average stock return variability by country. 
 
Two interactive models are used to test Hypothesis Two (with Hypothesis One tested using a 
non-interactive form of Model 1).  Model 1 tests the effects for a common/civil law split 
whereas Model 2 tests the effects for a split into the different civil legal origins (French, 
German and Nordic).  (This model excludes common law so that the civil law countries 
effects are seen relative to the common law effects.)   
 
The models used are:  
 
Model 1:   
FOLLANA _   = ++++++ RDLEGALIIALEGALLEGALRDIIA ** 543210 ββββββ  
++++++ LEVRETVAREVOLECMKTBKMVE 11109876 ββββββ
εβ +IND12  
 
where: 
ANA_FOLL Number of analysts following a company 
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IIA Identifiable Intangible assets on Balance Sheet 
RD Research and Development expense (R&D) 
LEGAL Legal origin (common or civil) 
LEGAL*IIA Interaction between legal origin and identifiable intangible assets 
LEGAL*RD Interaction between legal origin and R&D 
MVE Natural log of Market value of equity 
MKTBK Natural log of Market-to-book value of equity 
EC Natural log of Earnings change 
EVOL Natural log of Earnings volatility 
RETVAR Natural log of Variation on stock returns 
LEV Leverage 
IND Industry indicator variables4 
ε Error term 
 
 
Model 2:   
FOLLANA_   = GERRDFREIIAFREFRERDIIA 6543210 ** βββββββ ++++++ + 
+++++ RDNORIIANORNORRDGERIIAGER **** 1110987 βββββ
++++++ LEVRETVAREVOLECMKTBKMVE 171615141312 ββββββ
εβ +IND18  
 
 
Where the variables are the same as indicated in Model 1.1 except for: 
FRE Countries with a French legal origin 
FRE*IIA Interaction between French legal origin and identifiable intangibles 
FRE*RD Interaction between French legal origin and R&D 
GER Countries with a German legal origin 
GER*IIA Interaction between German legal origin and identifiable intangibles 
GER*RD Interaction between German legal origin and R&D 
NOR Countries with a Nordic legal origin 
NOR*IIA Interaction between Nordic legal origin and identifiable intangibles 
NOR*RD Interaction between Nordic legal origin and R&D 
 
                                                 
4
 There were ten industry indicator variables. 
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4.2.2 Interpreting the models 
In Model 1 the LEGAL variable is coded ‘1’ for companies in a common law country and ‘0’ 
for companies in civil law countries.  Thus the interaction terms, LEGAL*IIA and 
LEGAL*RD, capture the effect on analyst following in common law countries while the 
intangible variables (IIA and RD) represent the effects on analyst following within the civil 
law countries.  Model 2 replaces the legal origin variable with variables for French, German 
and Nordic legal origin (coded ‘1’ as appropriate or ‘0’ otherwise). Thus in this model the 
intangible variables represent common law effects. 
 
Between the two models, the effects of the intangible variables on analyst following in both 
the common and civil law companies as groups are observed.  If the dummy variable LEGAL 
in Model 1 was reversed (so ‘1’ for civil law and ‘0’ for common law) then the intangible 
effects observed in this ‘reversed’ Model 1 would be very similar to those observed in Model 
2, both in terms of sign and significance.  However, in reporting in the way chosen, the 
significance of these variables for each legal origin (common and civil) is observed separately 
over the two models. 
 
It is important to note that in the interactive model, just as in Model 1, the intangibles 
represent the effects where LEGAL is ‘0’ (i.e. the civil law countries), thus LEGAL 
represents the effects where the intangible variables are ‘0’ (i.e. the effect for the non-
intangible recognition companies).  Hence LEGAL cannot be interpreted as representing the 
full relationship between analyst following and common law.  A non-interactive model is 
needed to do this.5   
 
The results from two non-interactive models are reported (but not tabled) in Section 5.  The 
first non-interactive model is Model 1 without the LEGAL variable, run to test Hypothesis 
One, the effects of recognised intangibles on analyst following.  The second non-interactive 
model is the full Model 1, but without the interactions, run to test support for the assumption 
made in the study that analyst following is higher in civil law companies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The same rationale applies to Model 2 and the French, German and Nordic legal origin variables. 
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4.3 Predicted and test variables 
 
4.3.1  Analyst following (ANA_FOLL) 
Analyst following is measured using the total number of individual analysts who issue one-
year-ahead earnings forecasts for each company (Khanna et al., 2004). 
    
4.3.2 Intangible variables (IIA and RD) 
Both binary and magnitude measures were used for the intangible measures, with binary 
measures being dummy variables indicating the presence of identifiable intangible assets and 
R&D expenditure respectively (IIAB and RDB).   The magnitude measures for each were the 
actual levels of identifiable intangibles and R&D scaled by total assets (IIAM and RDM).   
 
Based on previous studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2001; Bhushan & Cho, 1996; Moyer, Chatfield & 
Sisneros, 1989) the relationship between the intangible variables and analyst following is 
expected to be positive.   
 
4.3.3 Legal origin variables 
Legal origin (LEGAL) was measured using a dummy variable of 1 if a company is of 
common law origin and 0 if not (Khanna et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1997).  The same 
dummy variable was used for French legal origin (FRE), German legal origin (GER) and 
Nordic legal origin (NOR). 
 
The legal origin variables were interacted with identifiable intangibles and R&D respectively.  
These measures provided the relative impact on the analyst data of identifiable intangibles and 
R&D with respect to legal origin. 
  
4.4 Control variables 
 
4.4.1 Company size (MVE) 
Company size was measured as the market capitalisation of a company in a given country in a 
particular fiscal year, estimated at the year end as the product of the number of common 
shares outstanding times the fiscal-year closing price.  Most analyst following studies control 
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for company size with prior research finding a positive relationship (e.g. Bhushan, 1989; 
Hong, Lim & Stein, 2000; Hope, 2004; Hussain, 2000; Marston, 1997).  
 
4.4.2 Market-to-book value of equity (MKTBK) 
Market-to-book value of equity was used as a proxy for growth options (Barron et al., 2002) 
and risk (Fama & French, 1992).  The association between market-to-book level and analyst 
following is mixed.  Doukas et al. (2005) find that low market-to-book companies (value 
companies) have lower external financing and investment and weaker analyst coverage than 
high market-to-book (growth) companies. In turn, high growth companies attract analysts 
(Bhushan, 1989). But Bhushan and Cho (1996) find companies with low market-to-book 
values may require more analyst scrutiny.   Hence the predicted sign for the variable in the 
model is uncertain. 
 
4.4.3 Earnings change (EC) 
Earnings change is a magnitude measure determined using the absolute value of the change in 
earnings over last year’s earnings (Hope, 2003c).  Greater earnings changes, although 
providing more potential for value-added analyst work, tend to lead to a negative relationship 
with analyst following because analysts prefer forecasting results that are more predictable 
(Hope, 2003c; Lang et al., 2004). Hence the sign is expected to be negative.  
 
4.4.4 Earnings volatility (EVOL) 
Earnings volatility has been measured as the standard deviation of earnings over a period of 
time (e.g. 200 days prior to year end in Brennan and Hughes (1991) to five years in Dichev 
and Tang (2008)). In this study it is measured as the standard deviation of earnings for the 
past three years.   Analysts tend to prefer companies with less volatile earnings. Where there 
is less variability in net income (earnings), analysts find companies are easier to follow 
(Bhushan, 1989; Hope, 2004). Overall, most studies support the finding that analysts 
themselves tend to prefer lower risk companies with less volatile earnings (Bricker, Grant, 
Fogarty & Previts,1999).  Hence, earnings volatility in the model is expected to be negatively 
related to analyst following in the model.   
 
4.4.5 Stock return variability (RETVAR) 
Stock return variability was measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 
the past 24 months. Although analyst following is observed to increase with return variability 
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(Bhushan, 1989; Marston, 1997), O’Brien & Bhushan (1990) find that there are increases in 
analyst following with stabilisation in return variability.  Although it would appear that 
analysts prefer more stable companies, the association between return variability and analyst 
following in the model could be either positive or negative. 
 
4.4.6 Financial leverage (LEV) 
Financial leverage was measured as total liabilities scaled by total assets (Hope, 2003a). 
Companies with higher leverage should have greater analyst following (Moyer et al., 1989), 
hence a positive relationship is expected in the model. 
 
4.4.7 Industry (IND) 
Analyst following may be influenced by industry type, so this was controlled for using 
industry dummy variables (IND).  For this study industry was coded on the basis of the SIC 
industry coding from the Compustat Global database.  This was used in preference to the 
IBES database codes where industry codes were not provided for a significant number of 
companies and would have reduced the sample considerably if this information was relied on.   
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for both the continuous variables and the indicator 
variables for the sample.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The mean number of analysts following a company is 7.57 with a median of 4. These results 
are very similar to those in Barth (2000) who examined US listed analyst-followed companies 
and found a mean analyst following of 7.27 with a median 4.17.  The highest number of 
analysts following any one company was 58 (not reported in this table).  English legal origin 
companies (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom) represent the highest 
proportion of the sample at 64.52 percent.  French legal origin countries (France and Italy) 
represent 16.09 percent, German legal origin countries (Germany and Switzerland) 15.29 
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percent and Nordic legal origin countries 7.52 percent.  Identifiable intangible assets are 
recognised by 64.52 percent of companies and R&D by 27.76 percent.  
 
5.2 Correlations 
 
Table 3 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients for the data.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
The highest correlation between independent variables is 0.733 between MVE and EVOL.   
This indicates that companies that have a high market value also experience high volatility in 
earnings.  As these two variables are measuring different aspects in the model, with market 
value of equity a measure of company size and earnings volatility a measure of the potential 
difficulty in predicting earnings, both variables are included in the model.  Excluding the 
correlations between legal origins, the remaining correlations between independent variables 
are not high values. 
 
Examining correlations with the dependent variable, the extent of analyst following, there is a 
high correlation of 0.718 between MVE and ANA_FOLL, confirming that analysts are likely 
to follow large companies. As expected from the high correlation between MVE and EVOL, 
there is also a reasonably high correlation between ANA_FOLL and EVOL of 0.559.  
ANA_FOLL is negatively correlated with RDM (but not with RDB), EC, RETVAR and 
LEGAL. 
 
5.3  Analyst following and intangible recognition  
 
Table 4 provides information on analyst following for companies that recognise and do not 
recognised intangibles.   
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Average analyst following is higher for companies that recognise intangibles than those that 
do not, with the highest following for companies that recognise both IIA and RD (at 11.55). 
Those companies that do not recognise intangibles have an average analyst following of 5.30.  
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If a non-interactive form of Model 1 is run without the LEGAL variable, coefficients for both 
IIA and RD and both positive and significant at the 0.001 level.  This supports Hypothesis 
One, namely that analyst following is greater for companies that recognise intangibles than 
for those that do not. 
 
5.4  Analyst following and intangible recognition across countries  
 
Table 5 provides information on country and legal origin analyst following as well as IIA and 
R&D proportionate recognition.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Average analyst following is higher in civil law countries (9.47 compared to 6.37 for common 
law companies), with the highest followings in Germany, France and Italy.6  This supports the 
contention by Core et al. (2006) that companies with strong shareholder rights have, on 
average, fewer analysts.   
 
However, analyst following may also be a factor of company size.  Statistical analysis of 
market value of equity for the companies by legal origin (not tabled) show that the civil law 
companies in the sample are larger than common law companies (based both on mean and 
median measures).  Additionally, within the civil law legal origins, those from the French 
legal origin are the largest, followed by the Nordic companies and then the German 
companies.  This reflects some of Barniv et al.’s (2005) findings, who find that when US 
companies are excluded from the common legal origin, the average number of analysts is 
highest in companies of French legal origin and lowest in companies of German legal origin 
(with common law and then Nordic legal origin in-between).    
 
The multivariate regression model controls for size (and other factors).   Running Model 1 
without the interactions results in a negative coefficient for the LEGAL variable, significant at 
the 0.001 level.  This supports the assumption made that, regardless of size (and other factors), 
                                                 
6
 Removing companies that report under US GAAP lowers the mean for the German legal origin countries to 
8.86, but both Germany and Switzerland still have high average analyst following compared to common law 
countries. 
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analyst following is lower in common law countries.  This concurs with the similar finding by 
Barniv et al. (2005).7 
 
Table 5 shows that there are large differences in proportionate intangible recognition between 
both common and civil law jurisdictions, and between the countries themselves.  There is a far 
higher proportion of identifiable intangibles recognition companies from a civil law origin 
(90.65 percent) compared to companies from a common law origin (48.16 percent).  
Additionally, the proportion of companies recognising R&D is also higher in civil law than in 
common law countries. The exception here is the French legal origin companies which have 
the lowest proportion of R&D, very similar to that exhibited by the common law countries.   
Ding, Entwistle and Stolowy (2004) comment that French GAAP allowed companies to 
capitalise their R&D expenses but that few companies do this.  However, this finding suggests 
that there is lower expensing of R&D as well. 
 
Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for IIA and R&D as a proportion of total assets for 
the analyst followed companies.   
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
It can be seen that companies from the common law countries have the highest levels of both 
identifiable intangibles and R&D (based on both mean and median).  This was tested on 
means using a single tailed t-test and found to be significant at the 0.001 level.  Mann-
Whitney tests on common law and civil law medians resulted in a significant difference for 
identifiable intangibles but not for R&D.    This test was repeated using R&D scaled by sales 
(where there are more extreme values) instead of total assets, but it resulted in the same 
outcome. 
 
In summary, a higher proportion of companies in civil law countries recognise both 
identifiable intangibles and R&D.  However, as a percentage of total assets, identifiable 
intangibles and R&D are larger in companies from common law countries.   
 
 
                                                 
7
 As the sample in Barniv et al. (2005) has eighty percent common law countries, they point out that the larger 
size of civil law companies helps avoid overweighting the common law companies. 
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5.5  Interactive model results 
 
5.5.1 Results for the full dataset using binary variables 
Table 7 provides the regression results for the interactive models using both binary intangible 
variables (representing the presence, not the magnitude of the intangible variables) in 
Columns A and B and the magnitude variables in Columns C and D.   
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
In Column A of Model 1 all the variables are significant at the 0.01 level with the exception 
of RETVAR.  The explanatory power of the model (the adjusted R-squared) is 0.567.  This is 
lower than the adjusted R-squared of 0.70 found by Barth (2000), using US-listed companies.  
However, it is higher than the results in international studies by Hope (2003b) and Chang et al. 
(2000) who achieved adjusted R-squares of 0.29 and 0.363 respectively.  This suggests that 
international studies result in a lower adjusted R-squares and that the results in this study fit 
within the range observed in other studies. 
 
The coefficients for the control variables are all of the predicted sign with the exception of 
EVOL and RETVAR.  The results indicate that analyst following is higher for companies that 
have more volatile earnings and for companies with greater variability in stock returns.  This 
is opposite to the negative effect expected. However, the positive relationship for stock return 
variability follows the findings of Bhushan (1989) and Marston (1997) who both observe that 
analyst following increases with return variability.  But the earnings volatility result is 
contrary to studies that find that analysts prefer companies with less volatile earnings (Bricker 
et al., 1999).   
 
MKTBK is significant and negative in the model.  This result indicates a higher analyst 
following for companies with lower market-to-book values, supporting the findings of 
Bhushan and Cho (1996) who find companies with low market-to-book values attract more 
analyst scrutiny. 
 
In Model 1 in Column A the coefficients on the variables representing the presence of 
identifiable intangibles and R&D are positive.  This indicates that in civil law countries 
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analyst following increases with their presence.  The interactive effect for both identifiable 
intangible assets and R&D is negative, indicating that the association is lower for companies 
in common law countries.   This supports Hypothesis Two, suggesting that analyst following 
does differ between companies from civil and common law countries with the recognition of 
intangibles, and in fact is greater for companies from civil law countries when intangibles are 
recognised.  This finding suggests that recognition of intangibles acts as a signal to analysts, 
increasing their interest, but more so in companies from civil than common law countries. 
 
Model 2 in Column B displays the results for the binary model where separate dummy 
variables are used for French, German, and Nordic legal origins.  The explanatory power of 
the model (the adjusted R-squared) is 0.571.  Results from the control variables remain as for 
Column A, although RETVAR becomes non-significant.   
 
In this specification, the coefficients for IIA and RD represent values for countries with 
common law legal systems.  The results indicate that in common law countries analyst 
following is not affected by the presence of identifiable intangibles, but increases with the 
presence of R&D (significant at a 0.01 level).  The significant positive interactive effects with 
each of the civil law legal origins (French, German and Nordic) indicate that the presence of 
either identifiable intangibles or R&D leads to an increase in analyst following of companies 
in each of the civil law countries (with the only exception being identifiable intangibles in the 
Nordic countries).   This lends further support to the conclusions for Hypothesis Two. 
 
5.5.2 Results for the full dataset using magnitude variables 
Columns C and D of Table 7 provide the results using the magnitude of intangibles as 
variables.  The adjusted R-squared for the models are 0.553 for Model 1 (Column C) and 
0.557 for Model 2 (Column D). These are slightly lower than for the models based on the 
binary variables. All the coefficients in Column C provide similar results in Column A, except 
that the interactive variables drop in significance to a 0.05 level (as does EVOL).  The 
positive coefficients for IIA and RD indicate that analyst following increases as their levels 
increase.  Whereas the binary model indicated that analyst following increases more in 
companies from civil law countries than in those from common law countries when 
intangibles are present, the results from the magnitude model indicate that this difference is 
also apparent with higher levels of recognised intangibles. 
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In Model 2 in Column D the control variables are similar to those of the binary model 
(Column B) in both signage and significance. The coefficients for IIA and RD are similar in 
significance to the binary model in Column B.  However there is less significance in the civil 
legal origin interactions with only the FRE*IIA interaction significant at the 0.05 level and 
the GER*RD interaction significant at the 0.01 level.   (Both interactive variables are positive.)  
 
Hence, analyst following increases with increasing levels of R&D for German legal origin 
companies and with increasing levels of identifiable intangibles in companies from a French 
legal origin.  
 
In summary, both the binary and magnitude model results support the existence of a 
difference as proposed in Hypothesis Two, with the difference favouring companies from 
civil law countries where analyst following increases more with the presence (and increasing 
levels of) intangible assets and R&D in these companies than those from common law 
countries. 
 
5.5.3 Multicollinearity 
Tests for multicollinearity, using variance inflation factors (VIFs) are run on Models 1 and 2 
(with both the binary and magnitude intangible variables).  The larger the value of a VIF for a 
predictor variable, the more severe the collinearity problem and as a guideline many authors 
recommend that a VIF greater than 10 suggests a collinearity difficulty (Cryer & Miller, 
1991).  The variance inflation factors all lay between 1.020 and 3.706, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not an issue.   
 
5.6  Robustness tests 
 
5.6.1 Country averaged control variables 
In a cross-country study there could be quite a variation in the control variables used between 
countries.  Some studies reduce this variation by scaling the control variables by the country 
average. In this study the control variables were all averaged by country and then all were 
logged for normalisation (except leverage which presented a normal distribution in its 
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unlogged form).  The models were then run to determine if the results are impacted by the 
inter-country variation.   
 
The results are not tabled, but the key change is that IIA becomes significant (and negative) in 
Model 1.2.  The interactive effect observed in the original model remains, with all legal origin 
interactions significant – even the NOR*IIA interaction, which in the earlier full model was 
not.  So this version of the model supports the earlier conclusion that there is a larger increase 
in analyst following in civil compared to common law countries with the presence of 
intangibles.  
 
5.6.2 Outliers 
The control variables in the models were winsorised and logged to eliminate outliers and to 
normalise the variables. However some studies such as Amir and Sougiannis (1999), Bhat, 
Hope and Kang (2006) and Matolcsy and Wyatt (2008) eliminate outliers from their model 
rather than winsorise.    Amir and Sougiannis (1999) delete 1.5 percent of their observations 
where the residual value is greater than 3; Matolcsy and Wyatt (2008) also use a boundary of 
3, whereas Bhat et al. (2006) use a residual boundary of 4.8     
 
To check whether the results are sensitive to outliers in the data, the analyst-only data was 
used with unwinsorised control variables, logged for normalisation (with the exception of 
leverage). Observations whose regression residuals fell outside four standard deviations from 
the mean were deleted (as per Bhat et al. 2006).  This reduced the sample size from 7233 to 
7198, eliminating only 35 outlier cases (0.5 percent). 
 
The results (not tabled) indicate very little difference from the original results except that the 
models are slightly stronger than the original with adjusted R-squares of 0.579 and 0.583 
(compared to 0.567 and 0.571).  The R&D variable dropped slightly in significance in Model 
2 and the interaction between Nordic and identifiable intangibles increased slightly in 
significance.   
 
Overall, the results indicate that the results are not sensitive to outliers and that either 
approach to modelling produces similar outcomes.  
                                                 
8
 Neither Matolcsy and Wyatt (2008) nor Bhat et al. (2006) indicate the number of outliers removed. 
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5.6.3 Country classifications 
Nobes (2008) classifies countries based on whether they have strong equity and are 
commercially driven (Class A), compared to weak equity, government driven and tax 
dominated (Class B).  Although the split is similar to the legal origin split (with the English 
origin countries fitting into Class A and the others fitting into Class B), Denmark is an 
exception and is a Class A company.  Hence the basic model is repeated where the Class A 
countries are grouped as ‘Nobes Class A’ and the Class B countries as ‘Nobes Class B’ in the 
model.  Two runs are made of the model, one using Nobes Class A as the binary ‘1’ variable 
and the other using Nobes Class B as the binary ‘1’ variable. 
 
The results (not tabled) show that essentially there are no differences resulting from the 
common/civil law split.  However, including Denmark in the strong equity countries, 
improves the strength of the model slightly. Hence it is concluded that analyst following 
increases with the presence of R&D in both strong and weak equity countries.  But for weak 
equity countries analyst following decreases with the presence of identifiable intangibles, 
whereas for strong equity countries it is not significant.   Overall, analyst following is lower in 
strong equity countries when identifiable intangibles and R&D are present.   
 
5.6.4 Indices 
Investor confidence in markets and market development is affected by legal investor 
protection across countries (La Porta et al. 1997, 1998).  Over the years empirical measures of 
shareholder protection that predict financial outcomes have been developed in the form of 
indices.  Using indices, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) find differences among legal origins in 
the protection of minority shareholders and creditors through corporate and bankruptcy laws 
(updated for creditors by Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer  (2007)).  Protection differs, too, in 
the regulation of security issuance through security laws (La Porta et al., 2006).  
 
This study uses legal origin as a proxy for investor protection.  To test for robustness 
additional measures of investor protection were used.  The model was rerun using the updated 
anti-directors’ rights (ADR) indices for each country (La Porta et al. 2006) and the anti-self-
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dealing (ASD) indices for each country (La Porta, de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2008).9  Both indices 
are significantly correlated with LEGAL at 0.857 for ADR and 0.928 for ASD.  Hence it 
would be expected that either variable could substitute for the LEGAL variable, but with ASD 
probably being a more effective substitute.  
 
Model 1 was run with each of the indices substituting for the LEGAL variable and although 
the model improves slightly from 0.567 to 0.570 for the ASD and 0.571 for the ADR model, 
it was concluded that whilst either index could effectively substitute for the LEGAL variable, 
they did not add anything to the outcome of the model. 
 
5.6.5 Loss-making companies 
The sample of analyst-followed companies consists of 79 percent profit-making companies 
and 21 percent loss-making companies.  To determine whether this was an influential factor, a 
dummy variable for loss-making companies was added to the model and the model rerun. 
Then the models were rerun based on samples split by profitability.   
 
Incorporating a dummy variable for loss-making companies (where a loss-making company 
equalled ‘1’ and profit-making equalled ‘0’) did not change any of the outcomes previously 
reported, but the variable itself was significant (and positive) indicating that loss-making 
companies are of interest to analysts.  In the split sample results (not tabled) the only 
difference from the full results is that for common law countries IIA is significant (and 
negative) at the 0.10 level, indicating that among profit-making companies in common law 
countries analyst following decreases with the presence of identifiable intangibles.  Splitting 
the sample also weakens the significance of the R&D interaction for loss-making companies.  
 
5.6.6 Reporting regime 
As the period of the study covers the transition from national GAAP to international GAAP 
(IFRS: International Financial Reporting Standards) the models are rerun with an additional 
control variable, IFRS, a dummy variable indicating whether the company is reporting under 
IFRS (where IFRS = 1) or not (IFRS = 0).  This indicates whether the reporting regime has 
any influence on the outcome. 
                                                 
9
 Mahoney (2009) reports some criticism of the use of legal indices and their appropriate construction, but in a 
study like this where the effect is a general one, this is not an issue. 
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The model results are in Table 8.   
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
Incorporating a control variable for IFRS does not impact any of the results and in fact 
increases the level of significance for the interactions displayed in the magnitude model 
results in Column D between FRE*IIA and NOR*IIA.   
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
 
This study examines whether legal origin impacts the relation between analyst following and 
recognised identifiable intangibles and R&D.  Although the findings are limited to companies 
that appear in both the Compustat Global and I/B/E/S databases and to the ten selected 
countries representing different legal origins, the study finds an impact.   
 
The study finds firstly that companies that recognise the existence of intangibles attract a 
higher analyst following than those that do not.  This confirms that in countries other than the 
US, accounting disclosures for intangibles are viewed as insufficient for the needs of investors 
and, as such, present an opportunity for analysts to add value as reflected in increased analyst 
coverage.   
 
The results from the study show a higher analyst following for civil law countries. Since 
shareholder’s rights are perceived to be weaker in civil law countries than in common law 
countries, this result supports the Core et al. (2006) finding that companies with strong 
shareholder rights have on average fewer analysts.   However, it also indicates that in civil 
law jurisdictions general purpose financial statements still leave more opportunity for analysts 
to make a contribution to market value.   
 
The study finds that where companies recognise intangibles, the increase in analyst following 
is larger for companies in civil law countries than in companies from common law countries. 
This suggests that civil law companies that recognise intangibles provide a greater 
opportunity for analysts to make a contribution to investors than their common law 
counterparts.  This, in turn, suggests that existing accounting disclosures for intangibles are 
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less informative in civil law countries than in common law countries. This is despite the fact 
that a higher proportion of civil law companies recognise identifiable intangibles and R&D.   
 
The overall findings are not sensitive to country-based averaging measures, the removal of 
outliers, a different classification (Nobes), variations in anti-directors rights and anti-self 
dealing indices, or the presence of loss-making companies.  With the period of the study 
covering a time interval when many companies were adopting IFRS, this study also finds that 
the results are not sensitive to this change, suggesting that although there may be more 
conformity under an international reporting regime, companies reporting intangibles provide 
analysts with a greater opportunity to add value in civil law countries. 
 
 
30 
References 
 
Aboody, D., & Lev, B.  (1998). The value relevance of intangibles: the case of software 
capitalisation.  Journal of Accounting Research, 36(Supplement), 161-191. 
 
Ahmed, A. S., Kilic, E., & Lobo, G. J. (2006). Does recognition versus disclosure matter? 
Evidence from value-relevance of banks' recognized and disclosed derivative financial 
instruments. The Accounting Review, 81(3), 567-588.   
 
Alford, A. W., & Berger, P. G. (1999). A simultaneous analysis of forecast accuracy, analyst 
following, and trading volume. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 14(3), 219-
240.  
 
Amir, E., & Lev, B.I. (1996).  Value-relevance of nonfinancial information: the wireless 
communications industry.  Journal of Accounting & Economics, 22(1), 3-30. 
 
Amir, E., Lev, B. I., & Sougiannis, T. (2003). Do financial analysts get intangibles? European 
Accounting Review, 12(4), 635-659.  
 
Amir, E., & Sougiannis, T. (1999). Analysts' interpretation and investors' valuation of tax 
carryforwards. Contemporary Accounting Research, 16(1), 1-33.   
 
Arewa, O. (2004).  Breaking through the intangibles haze: business paradigms and changing 
business discourse.  Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 04-14. Available from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=589205.  
 
Ball, R., Kothari, S. P., & Robin, A. (2000). The effect of international institutional factors on 
properties of accounting earnings. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 29(1), 1-51.  
 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. (2003). Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting 
income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 36(1-3), 235-
270.   
 
Ballow, J. J., Burgman, R., & Molnar, M. J. (2004). Managing for shareholder value: 
intangibles, future value and investment decisions. Journal of Business Strategy, 25(3), 
26-34. 
 
Barniv, R., Myring, M., & Thomas, W. B. (2005). The association between the legal and 
financial reporting environments and forecast performance of individual analysts. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 22(4), 727-758.   
 
31 
Barron, O. E., Byard, D., Kile, C., & Riedl, E. J. (2002). High-technology intangibles and 
analysts' forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(2), 289-312.  
 
Barth, M.E. (2000).  Valuation-based accounting research: implications for financial reporting 
and opportunities for future research.  Accounting & Finance, 40(1), 7-31. 
 
Barth, M. E., Clinch, G., & Shibano, T. (2003). Market effects of recognition and disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 41(4), 581-609.   
 
Barth, M.E., Kasznik, R., & McNichols, M.F.  (2001).   Analyst coverage and intangible 
assets.  Journal of Accounting Research, 39(1), 1-34. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. E. (2003). Law and finance: Why does legal 
origin matter? Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), 653-675.  
 
Bhat, G., Hope, O.-K., & Kang, T. (2006). Does corporate governance transparency affect the 
accuracy of analyst forecasts? Accounting & Finance, 46(5), 715-732.   
 
Bhushan, R. (1989).  Firm characteristics and analyst following.  Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, 11(2), 255-274. 
 
Bhushan, R., & Cho, J.Y.  (1996).   Acquisitions and the information environment of 
companies.  The Financial Review, 31(1), 105-125. 
 
Brennan, M.J., & Hughes, P. (1991). Stock prices and the supply of information.  The Journal 
of Finance, 46(5), 1665 -1691. 
 
Brennan, M. J., Jegadeesh, N., & Swaminathan, B. (1993). Investment analysis and the 
adjustment of stock prices to common information. The Review of Financial Studies, 
6(4), 799-824.  
 
Brennan, M. J., & Subrahmanyam, A. (1995). Investment analysis and price formation in 
securities markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(3), 361-382.  
 
Bricker, R., Grant, J., Fogarty, T. J., & Previts, G. J.  (1999). Determinants of analyst 
following.  Journal of Corporate Communications, 1, 1-29. 
 
Bush, T. (2005). 'Divided by common language' Where economics meets the law: US 
reporting systems compared to other markets. London: Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales.  
 
32 
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate 
governance. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32(1-3), 237-333.  
 
Bushman, R. M., Piotroski, J. D., & Smith, A. J. (2004). What determines corporate 
transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 207-252.  
  
Chalmers, K., Clinch, G., & Godfrey, J. M. (2008). Adoption of International financial 
Reporting Standards: Impact on the value relevance of intangible assets. Australian 
Accounting Review, 18(3), 237-247.   
 
Chang, J., Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. (2000). Analyst activity around the world.  HBS 
Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 01-061. http://ssrn.com/abstract=204570.  
 
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does Weak Governance Cause Weak 
Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' 
Expectations. Journal of Finance, 61(2), 655-687.  
 
Dechow, P. M. (1994). Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance. 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, 18(1), 3-42.  
 
Dichev, I.A. and Tang, V.W. (2008). Earnings volatility and earnings predictability.  Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 47(1), 160-181.  
 
Ding, Y., Entwistle, G., & Stolowy, H. (2004). International differences in research and 
development reporting practices: A French and Canadian comparison. Advances in 
International Accounting, 17, 55-72.   
 
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., & Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 84(2), 299-329.   
  
Fama, E.F., & French, K.R.  (1992). The cross-section of expected stock returns.  The Journal 
of Finance, 47(2), 427-465. 
 
Francis, J. R., Khurana, I. K., & Pereira, R. (2003). The role of accounting and auditing in 
corporate governance and the development of financial markets around the world. Asia-
Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 10(1), 1-30.  
 
Francis, J., & Schipper, K.  (1999).  Have financial statements lost their relevance?  Journal 
of Accounting Research, 37(2), 319-352. 
 
Frankel, R., Kothari, S. P., & Weber, D. P. (2003). Determinants of the informativeness of 
analyst research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1-2), 29-54.   
33 
 
Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004). Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 37(2), 229-259.  
 
Garcia-Ayuso, M. (2003). Factors explaining the inefficient valuation of intangibles. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability, 16(1), 57-69.  
 
Gaum, G., Ittner, C., Larcker, D., Low, J., Siesfeld, T., & Malone, M.S. (2000).  Introducing 
the new value creation index.  Forbes, 165(8), 140-143. 
 
Hall, B. H., & Oriani, R. (2005). Does the market value R&D investment by European 
Companies?  Evidence from a panel of manufacturing companies in France, Germany 
and Italy: NBER Working Paper No. W10408. http://ssrn.com/abstract=528989.  
 
Healy, P.M., & Palepu, K.G.  (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the 
capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature.  Journal of Accounting 
& Economics, 31(1-3), 405-440. 
 
Holland, J. (2003). Intellectual capital and the capital market - organisation & competence. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability, 16(1), 39-48.  
 
Hong, H., Lim, T., & Stein, J. C. (2000). Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst coverage, and 
the profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance, 55(1), 265-295.  
 
Hope, O.-K. (2003a). Accounting policy disclosures and analysts' forecasts. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 20(2), 295-321.  
 
Hope, O.-K. (2003b). Analyst following and the influence of disclosure components, IPOs 
and ownership concentration. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 10(2), 
117-141. 
 
Hope, O.-K. (2003c). Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and analysts' 
forecast accuracy: an international study. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(2), 235-
272.  
 
Hope, O.-K. (2003d). Firm-level disclosures and the relative roles of culture and legal origin. 
Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 14(3), 218-248. 
 
Hope, O.-K. (2004). Variations in the financial reporting environment and earnings 
forecasting. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 15(1), 21-
43. 
34 
Hussain, S. (2000). Simultaneous determination of UK analyst following and institutional 
ownership. Accounting & Business Research, 30(2), 111-124.  
 
Irvine, P. J. (2003). The incremental impact of analyst initiation of coverage. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 9(4), 431-451.  
 
Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure practices of foreign companies 
interacting with US markets. Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 475-508.  
 
La Porta, R., Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Good news for value stocks: 
Further evidence on market efficiency. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 859-874.   
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2006). The law and economics of self-
dealing.  Retrieved from: 
http://www.cfainstitute.org.cn/foundation/pdf/2006em_laporta.pdf. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The economic consequences of 
legal origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), 285-332.   
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and finance. 
The Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1150.  
  
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1999). Corporate ownership 
around the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.  
 
Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P. (2003). ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: does cross 
listing in the United States improve a firm's information environment and increase 
market value? Journal of Accounting Research, 41(2), 317-345.  
 
Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P. (2004). Concentrated control, analyst following and 
valuation: do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of 
Accounting Research, 42(3), 589-623.  
 
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R.  (1996).  Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior.  The 
Accounting Review, 71(4), 467-492. 
 
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection: an 
international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69(3), 505-527.  
 
Lev, B. I., & Daum, J. H. (2004). The dominance of intangible assets: consequences for 
enterprise management and corporate reporting. Measuring Business Excellence, 8(1), 
6-17.   
35 
Lev, B., & Zarowin, P.  (1999). The boundaries of financial reporting and how to extend them.  
Journal of Accounting Research, 37(2), 353-385. 
 
Lys, T., & Soo, L. G. (1995). Analysts' forecast precision as a response to competition. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 10(4), 751-765.  
 
Marston, C. (1997).  Firm characteristics and analyst following in the UK.  British Accounting 
Review, 29, 335-347.  
 
Matolcsy, Z. P., & Wyatt, A. (2006). Capitalized intangibles and financial analysts. 
Accounting & Finance, 46(3), 457-479.  
 
McNichols, M. F., & O'Brien, P. C. (1997). Self-selection and analyst coverage. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 35 Supplement(3), 167-199.   
 
Moyer, R. C., Chatfield, R. E., & Sisneros, P. M. (1989). Security analyst monitoring activity: 
Agency costs and information demands. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 
24(4), 503-512.  
 
Munari, F., Oriani, R., & Sobrero, M. (2005). Do owner identity and financial markets affect 
R&D investments? An analysis of Western European companies. SSRN Working 
Papers:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=717684.  
 
Nobes, C. (2008). Accounting classification in the IFRS era. Australian Accounting Review, 
18(3), 191-198.  
 
O'Brien, P. C., & Bhushan, R. (1990). Analyst following and institutional ownership.  Journal 
of Accounting Research, 28 Supplement (3), 55-82.  
 
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data. Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.  
  
Roulstone, D. T. (2003). Analyst following and market liquidity. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 20(3), 151-178.  
 
Wyatt, A.  (2005). Accounting recognition of intangible assets: Theory and evidence on 
economic determinants.  The Accounting Review, 80(5), 967-1003. 
 
Wyatt, A. (2008). What financial and non-financial information on intangibles is value-
relevant? A review of the evidence. Accounting & Business Research, 38(3), 217-256.   
36 
Table 1 
Variables  
 
Variables Description 
 
Predicted  
ANA_FOLL Number of analysts following a firm 
 
Test  
IIAB Identifiable intangible assets (dummy variable where 1 = presence and 0 = absence) 
RDB Research and development expense (dummy variable where 1 = presence and 0 = absence) 
IIAM Magnitude of identifiable intangible assets (amount scaled by total assets) 
RDM Magnitude of research and development expense (amount scaled by total assets) 
LEGAL Legal origin (dummy variable where 1= common/English law and 0 = civil law) representing 
countries with an English legal origin for descriptive statistics 
FRE Countries with a French legal origin 
GER Countries with a German legal origin 
NOR Countries with a Nordic legal origin 
LEGAL*IIA Interaction between common law/English legal origin and identifiable intangible assets  
LEGAL*RD Interaction between legal origin and R&D 
FRE*IIA Interaction between French legal origin and identifiable intangible assets 
FRE*RD Interaction between French legal origin and R&D 
GER*IIA Interaction between German legal origin and identifiable intangible assets 
GER*RD Interaction between German legal origin and R&D 
NOR*IIA Interaction between Nordic legal origin and identifiable intangible assets  
NOR*RD Interaction between Nordic legal origin and R&D 
 
 
Control  
MVE Natural log of Market value of equity  
MKTBK Natural log of Market-to-book value of equity  
EC Natural log of Earnings change  
EVOL Natural log of Earnings volatility 
RETVAR Natural log of Variation on stock returns 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets 
IND Industry indicator variables using 1/0 dummy variables for SIC Industry sectors 1 – 10  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics (N = 7233) 
 
Continuous Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. 
ANA_FOLL Number of analysts following a company 7.5700 4.0000 8.3330 
IIAM Identifiable intangible assets scaled by total assets 0.0473 0.0056 0.1083 
RDM Research and development scaled by total assets 0.0264 0.0000 0.0941 
MVE Natural log of Market value of equity  5.8877 5.7589 1.9141 
MKTBK Natural log of Market to book value of equity 0.8136 0.8026 0.6936 
EC Natural log of Earnings change – absolute of the change in current year’s earnings with respect to 
previous year’s earnings 
-0.6175 -0.6164 1.5072 
EVOL Natural log of Earnings volatility - standard deviation of earnings for the past three years 2.2362 2.1473 1.9765 
RETVAR Natural log of Stock returns variability - standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past 
24 months  
2.3187 2.2548 0.6207 
LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets 0.5324 0.5400 0.2291 
Indicator Variables  Proportion of Total 
IIAB Company has recognised identifiable intangible assets  64.52  
RDB Company has recognised research and development expenditure  27.76  
LEGAL Company reporting in an English-based legal jurisdiction  61.09  
FRENCH Company reporting in a French-based legal jurisdiction  16.09  
GERMAN Company reporting in a German-based legal jurisdiction  15.29  
NORDIC Company reporting in a Nordic-based legal jurisdiction  7.52  
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations (N = 7233) 
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ANA_FOLL 1.000               
IIAB 0.194** 1.000              
RDB 0.191** 0.139** 1.000             
IIAM 0.045** 0.323** 0.001 1.000            
RDM -0.032** 0.015 0.448** 0.001 1.000           
MVE 0.718** 0.175** 0.114** 0.032** -0.121** 1.000          
MKTBK 0.127** 0.049** 0.073** 0.015 0.099** 0.273** 1.000         
EC -0.129** -0.030** 0.017** -0.008 -0.006 -0.162** -0.110** 1.000        
EVOL 0.559** 0.149** 0.154** 0.007 -0.039** 0.733** 0.061** 0.157** 1.000       
RETVAR -0.253** -0.120** 0.020* -0.009 0.156** -0.354** -0.020 0.216** -0.130** 1.000      
LEV 0.177** 0.134** -0.102** -0.025* -0.131** 0.156** -0.024* 0.013 0.211** -0.096** 1.000     
LEGAL  -0.182** -0.434** -0.123** -0.006 0.009 -0.115** -0.013 -0.014 -0.196** 0.090** -0.142** 1.000    
FRE  0.139** 0.307** -0.053** 0.055** -0.061** 0.089** -0.019 -0.014 0.003 -0.098** 0.189** -
0.549** 
1.000   
GER  0.090** 0.237** 0.145** -0.011 0.013 0.027* -0.045** 0.030* 0.048** -0.012 0.016 -
0.532** 
-
0.186** 
1.000  
NOR  0.019 0.051** 0.102** -0.051** 0.051** 0.051** 0.113** 0.005 0.294** -0.013 -0.024* -
0.357** 
-
0.125** 
-
0.121** 
1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
IIAB and R&DB are the binary variables; IIAM and R&DM are the magnitude variables (i.e. IIA/TA and R&D/TA) 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics for analyst following in companies that recognise/do not recognise 
identifiable intangible assets (IIA) and/or research & development expenditure (RD) 
 
Companies N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Lower 
Quartile 
Median Upper 
Quartile 
Min Max 
         
All  7233 7.57 8.333 2 4 10 1 58 
 
        
Recognising:         
Neither IIA nor 
RD 
2050 5.30 5.693 1 3 7 1 47 
IIA (with or 
without RD) 
4679 8.77 9.211 2 6 12 1 58 
RD (with or 
without IIA) 
2038 10.11 10.955 2 6 14 1 58 
Both IIA & RD  1534 11.55 11.751 2 8 16 1 58 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics for analyst following and proportionate identifiable intangibles 
(IIA) and R&D disclosure by country and legal origin 
 
 
 Number of Analysts IIA R&D 
 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
No. 
 
% 
 
No. 
 
% 
         
Common Law 4419 6.37 4 6.545 2128 48.16 1050 23.76 
Civil Law 2814 9.47 5 10.263 2551 90.65 988 35.11 
Total 7233 7.57 4 8.333 4679 64.69 2038 28.18 
     
    
Australia 865 5.15 3 4.270 466 53.87 128 14.80 
Canada 998 8.06 6 7.042 487 48.80 257 25.75 
New Zealand 147 4.99 5 3.182 67 45.58 21 14.29 
PUK 2409 6.19 3 7.002 1108 45.99 644 26.73 
English Legal Origin 4419 6.37 4 6.545 2128 48.16 1050 23.76 
     
    
France 792 10.77 7 10.496 775 97.85 202 25.51 
Italy 372 9.06 6 9.498 368 98.92 63 16.94 
French Legal Origin 1164 10.22 6.5 10.215 1143 98.20 265 22.77 
     
    
Germany 768 9.92 4 11.849 721 93.88 339 44.14 
Switzerland 338 8.06 5 8.408 289 85.80 143 42.31 
German Legal Origin 1106 9.35 5 10.943 1010 91.32 482 43.58 
     
    
Denmark 170 7.27 5 7.520 116 68.24 72 42.35 
Sweden 374 8.52 5.5 9.153 282 75.40 169 45.19 
Nordic Legal Origin 544 8.13 5 8.688 398 73.16 241 44.30 
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Table 6 
Descriptive statistics for analyst-followed companies recognising identifiable intangible 
assets and R&D  
 
   
Country and 
Legal origin (LO) 
Identifiable Intangible Assets 
(IIA/Total Assets) 
Research & Development 
(R&D/Total Assets) 
N Mean StDev Median N Mean StDev Median 
  
   
 
   
Common Law 2128 0.0972 0.1572 0.0295 1050 0.1139 0.1970 0.0423 
Civil Law 2551 0.0531 0.0912 0.0178 988 0.0724 0.0984 0.0356 
         
Australia 466 0.1208 0.1826 0.0371 128 0.1109 0.2214 0.0251 
Canada 487 0.0882 0.1336 0.0341 257 0.1607 0.2584 0.0776 
New Zealand 67 0.0914 0.1556 0.0266 21 0.0233 0.0316 0.0109 
United Kingdom 1108 0.0917 0.1545 0.0265 644 0.0988 0.1600 0.0396 
English LO 2128 0.0972 0.1572 0.0295 1050 0.1139 0.1970 0.0423 
         
France 775 0.0616 0.0951 0.0197 202 0.0697 0.1145 0.0264 
Italy 368 0.0630 0.1044 0.0219 63 0.0232 0.0247 0.0142 
French LO 1143 0.0620 0.0973 0.0204 265 0.0586 0.1026 0.0240 
         
Germany 721 0.0554 0.1044 0.0185 339 0.0699 0.0806 0.0461 
Switzerland 289 0.0324 0.0500 0.0151 143 0.0617 0.0599 0.0476 
German LO 1010 0.0489 0.0927 0.0173 482 0.0674 0.0751 0.0465 
         
Denmark 116 0.0338 0.0555 0.0151 72 0.1098 0.1085 0.0942 
Sweden 282 0.0397 0.0636 0.0140 169 0.0921 0.1336 0.0323 
Nordic LO 398 0.0380 0.0614 0.0142 241 0.0974 0.1267 0.0446 
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Table 7 
OLS Regression results for analyst following   
 
 
 Binary Models1 Magnitude Models2 
 Predicted 
sign 
(A) 
Model 1 
(B) 
Model 2 
(C) 
Model 1 
(D) 
Model 2 
Test Variables      
IIA + 2.373 -0.216 4.198 0.724 
  (6.529)*** (-1.260) (3.511)*** (1.027) 
RD + 3.559 0.668 8.332 4.228 
  (15.712)*** (3.203)*** (5.220)*** (5.216)*** 
LEGAL  2.006  -0.949  
  (5.301)***  (-5.723)***  
LEGAL*IIA  -2.564  -3.453  
  (-6.398)***  (-2.485)**  
LEGAL*RD  -2.817  -3.794  
  (-9.548)***  (-2.167)**  
FRE   -4.169  1.313 
   (-3.457)***  (5.859)*** 
FRE*IIA   5.341  4.659 
   (4.391)***  (2.551)** 
FRE*RD   3.000  -0.275 
   (6.940)***  (-0.089) 
GER   -2.086  1.067 
   (-3.561)***  (4.648)*** 
GER*IIA   2.296  0.863 
   (3.772)***  (0.432) 
GER*RD   3.637  13.830 
   (9.395)***  (4.760)*** 
NOR   -2.215  -0.600 
   (-4.299)***  (-1.826)* 
NOR*IIA   0.875  -2.433 
   (1.554)  (-0.548) 
NOR*RD   2.306  2.258 
   (4.447)***  (0.866) 
Control Variables      
MVE +
 
3.004 2.845 3.156 2.986 
  (47.543)*** (42.791)*** (49.456)*** (43.966)*** 
MKTBK +/- -0.884 -0.720 -1.003 -0.834 
  (-8.727)*** (-6.975)*** (-9.675)*** (-7.889)*** 
EC - -0.165 -0.216 -0.141 -0.203 
  (-3.418)*** (-4.454)*** (-2.876)*** (-4.101)*** 
EVOL - 0.159 0.350 0.138 0.334 
  (2.771)*** (5.601)*** (2.399)** (5.244)*** 
RETVAR +/- 0.221 0.180 0.232 0.183 
  (1.878)* (1.533) (1.931)* (1.530) 
LEV + 1.700 1.324 1.604 1.272 
  (5.560)*** (4.285)*** (5.166)*** (4.045)*** 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included 
       
Intercept  -13.888 -11.178 -11.451 -11.709 
  (-25.013)*** (22.620)*** (-23.410)*** (-23.620)*** 
N  7233 7233 7233 7233 
Adj. R2  0.567 0.571 0.553 0.557 
F-Statistic (Two-tailed 
test) 
 474.292*** 371.284*** 448.535*** 350.838*** 
      
1Binary Models use dummy variables for IIA and R&D (IIAB and R&DB) where 1 = company recognition and 0 = no 
company recognition  
2Magnitude Models use the actual values of IIA and R&D scaled by total assets (IIAM and R&DM) 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed 
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Table 8 
OLS Regression results for analyst following incorporating an IFRS variable   
 
 
 Binary Models1 Magnitude Models2 
 Predicted 
sign 
(A) 
Model 1 
(B) 
Model 2 
(C) 
Model 1 
(D) 
Model 2 
Test Variables      
IIA + 2.361 -0.280 4.180 0.665 
  (6.494)*** (-1.614) (3.496)*** (0.942) 
RD + 3.560 0.692 8.379 4.231 
  (15.723)*** (3.315)*** (5.248)*** (5.221)*** 
LEGAL  2.106  -0.870  
  (5.498)***  (-4.978)***  
LEGAL*IIA  -2.598  -3.486  
  (-6.477)***  (-2.508)**  
LEGAL*RD  -2.800  -3.833  
  (-9.485)***  (-2.189)**  
FRE   -4.321  1.246 
   (-3.579)***  (5.469)*** 
FRE*IIA   5.435  4.699 
   (4.467)***  (2.573)*** 
FRE*RD   2.999  -0.150 
   (6.941)***  (-0.049) 
GER   -2.277  0.945 
   (-3.849)***  (3.910)*** 
GER*IIA   2.352  0.920 
   (3.862)***  (0.461) 
GER*RD   3.637  14.023 
   (9.398)***  (4.823)*** 
NOR   -2.321  -0.679 
   (-4.487)***  (-2.044)** 
NOR*IIA   0.884  -2.741 
   (1.570)  (-0.617) 
NOR*RD   2.271  2.242 
   (4.379)***  (0.860) 
Control Variables      
MVE +
 
3.001 2.841 3.154 2.982 
  (47.502)*** (42.714)*** (49.402)*** (43.892)*** 
MKTBK +/- -0.895 -0.734 -1.012 -0.844 
  (-8.815)*** (-7.098)*** (-9.745)*** (-7.974)*** 
EC - -0.170 -0.224 -0.145 -0.208 
  (-3.525)*** (-4.602)*** (-2.961)*** (-4.200)*** 
EVOL - 0.167 0.364 0.145 0.343 
  (2.910)*** (5.791)*** (2.512)** (5.367)*** 
RETVAR +/- 0.232 0.195 0.241 0.195 
  (1.965)** (1.660)* (2.010)** (1.629) 
LEV + 1.680 1.287 1.585 1.242 
  (5.493)*** (4.162)*** (5.100)*** (3.943)*** 
IFRS +/- 0.240 0.327 0.202 0.233 
  (1.688)* (2.287)** (1.417) (1.625) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included 
       
Intercept  -14.068 -11.278 -11.608 -11.793 
  (-24.885)*** (22.40)*** (-23.148)*** (-23.663)*** 
N  7233 7233 7233 7233 
Adj. R2  0.567 0.571 0.553 0.557 
F-Statistic (Two-tailed 
test) 
 41.958*** 37.937*** 427.332*** 338.019*** 
1Binary Models use dummy variables for IIA and R&D (IIAB and R&DB) where 1 = company recognition and 0 = no 
company recognition  
2Magnitude Models use the actual values of IIA and R&D scaled by total assets (IIAM and R&DM) 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed 
 
